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Abstract 
The results of this collection allow for preliminary conclusions about the nuanced interplay 
between Europeanization and domestication forces in EU implementation, which await 
testing in different contexts. Some policies lend themselves more to a strategy allowing for 
extensive domestication than others; but to be effective, decentralized implementing actors 
need both power and capabilities. Europeanization dynamics strongly influence the direction 
of domestication of EU policy, but if EU requirements are incompatible with national political 
preferences domestication trumps Europeanization. Domestication equally prevails if the 
relationship between EU and national policy is ambiguous and frontline implementers have 
high discretion. The trend toward the Europeanization of direct EU enforcement challenges 
its legitimacy. This has implications for EU researchers and practitioners, and suggests 
methodological challenges and future research trajectories for a performance perspective on 
EU implementation. More comparative research is needed about the trade-offs between 
conformance, diversity, and performance in EU multilevel governance. 
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What have we learned? 
The contributions to this collection present findings and ideas that advance our knowledge of 
three aspects. First, they illuminate diverse responses to centrally decided policies within the 
EU’s multilevel structure (Héritier 1999; Thomann 2015). Second, they provide valuable 
insights in the mechanisms underlying the application and enforcement of EU policies in 
practice (Versluis 2007). Third, they help us understand the motivations and roles of individual 
actors implementing EU policy (Tyler 1990; Woll and Jacquot 2010). We first summarize the 
findings and how they mutually contribute to answering these questions (see Table 1). These 
results bear concrete implications for Europeanization scholars and EU practitioners. We then 
discuss their implications in light of the central hypothesis we have put forward (Thomann and 
Sager 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>): that the interplay 
of Europeanization and domestication dynamics is a central explanation for implementation 
performance in the EU (Bugdahn 2005). Indeed, the findings allow for a preliminary 
identification of conditions that matter in this interplay. These insights lead us to outline the 
promise and limitations of a more performance-oriented perspective on EU implementation 
to complement established compliance perspectives. We discuss methodological 
considerations and future research trajectories in the quest to gradually gain a fuller picture 
of the EU’s problem-solving capacity in practice. 
Responses to EU law beyond compliance 
The findings presented by Thomann and Zhelyazkova (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD 
/UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) paint the first large-scale picture of the diverse legal 
interpretations of EU law by 27 member states across two policy areas. Their study empirically 
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shows how ‘member states simultaneously strive to achieve compliance, and adapt EU 
policies to their local contexts. The resulting diversity in compliant transposition remains 
concealed when only looking at legal compliance’ (Thomann and Zhelyazkova 2017 <THIS 
ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>: 19). The authors measure and 
describe the patterns and extent of customization in its different directions (Bauer and Knill 
2014), conceptually (not necessarily empirically) independent of the compliance question. 
This in turn paves the way for studying the reasons and implications of this diversity (Héritier 
1999; Majone 1999) in a systematic, cumulative fashion.  
Substantively, Thomann and Zhelyazkova (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE 
DETAILS AT PROOF>) provide evidence for two phenomena. First, the customization of EU 
provisions follows pronounced policy-specific logics, that is, the direction of flexibility 
indicated by EU rules. Conversely, contrary to previous case studies, their large-N approach 
does not offer evidence for distinct country-specific customization styles (Falkner et al. 2005; 
Thomann 2015; Thomson 2009; Toshkov 2007; Versluis 2007). Second, EU rules change along 
different dimensions that represent ‘distinct aspects of state action and illuminate a 
differentiation of variation in national adaptation strategies that can be insightful’ (Thomann 
and Zhelyazkova 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>: 7). The 
interplay of customized density and restrictiveness tells us about the problem-solving 
strategies of member states. For example, member states may differentiate EU rules in order 
to create exemptions, or they may do so in order to render EU rules more restrictive.  
Thomann and Zhelyazkova (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT 
PROOF>) do not shed light on the actual legislative mechanisms causing customization 
patterns. Mastenbroek partly fills this gap. She finds that most Dutch legislative drafters 
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responsible for EU compliance try ‘to integrate EU legal requirements with national policy 
demands’ (Mastenbroek 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>: 
4-5).  
Similarly arguing that there is more to implementation than compliance, Heidbreder (2017 
<THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) asks which implementation 
strategies appear most promising for achieving effective implementation in a multilevel 
setting. Her first theoretical contribution lies in deriving a typology of implementation 
strategies in the EU that overcomes the often criticized top-down versus bottom-up 
dichotomy, by linking it with Hooghe and Mark’s (2003) two types of multi-level governance. 
She argues that in the EU, top-down and bottom-up elements are constantly intertwined, 
while the different levels of its system can also be in more vertical or more horizontal 
relationships. Based on these considerations, she identifies four strategies – centralization, 
agency, convergence and networks – for policy implementation in the EU, each with its unique 
characteristics, creation mechanisms, implementation logics and policy decision traits. A 
second contribution of Heidbreder’s (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS 
AT PROOF>) study lies in fleshing out expectations about the effectiveness of different 
implementation strategies based on Matland’s (1995) two dimensions of ambiguity and 
conflict. By discussing several illustrations for her typology, Heidbreder (2017 <THIS ISSUE: 
PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) convincingly demonstrates how this 
heuristic helps us understand why certain implementation strategies are successful in some 
contexts but not in others. 
Taken together, the findings allow for a substantive conclusion: that characteristics of policies, 
in interaction with domestic political contexts, determine the responses of member states to 
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EU policy – ultimately, the politics of implementation (Lowi 1972). Also in compliance 
research, patterns of EU implementation appear strongly policy- and country-specific 
(Mastenbroek 2005; Steunenberg 2007; Treib 2014). For researchers, this implies that 
diversity is inherent in EU implementation. A one-size-fits-all solution to effective policy 
implementation does not exist. While this may not be surprising, an important endeavor is 
still to gain a better understanding of the relevant properties of EU and domestic policies and 
institutions that trigger different implementation dynamics (see also Knill 2015). In the long 
term, such inquiries should be extended to include policy outcomes and impacts as the 
ultimate interest of a performance-oriented perspective (e.g., Skjærseth and Wettestadt 
2008; Toshkov and de Haan 2013). Potentially relevant policy features include the direction of 
flexibility allowed by rules with different logics in contexts of positive or negative integration 
(Thomann and Zhelyazkova 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT 
PROOF>), as well as the levels of ambiguity and conflict of a policy (Heidbreder 2017 <THIS 
ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>; Matland 1995). 
These findings also provide insights for EU policymakers. First, legal compliance is simply one 
of many possible transposition outcomes, and far from ‘the end of the story’. Thus, if the 
interest lies in joint solutions to shared policy problems, then we need to consider the 
dynamics of customization (Thomann 2015) and performance in practice (Bondarouk and 
Liefferink 2016; Bondarouk and Mastenbroek 2017). Second, EU steering matters, as national 
deviations from EU rules relatively consistently follow the direction of flexibility indicated by 
EU legislation (Thomann and Zhelyazkova 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE 
DETAILS AT PROOF>). This then also means that such adaptations (e.g., gold-plating) often do 
not require regulatory action from a conformance perspective. Third, there are appropriate 
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(and inappropriate) implementation strategies for different policies. Thus, it is worth 
considering the nature, ambiguity and regulatory logic of the policy under question, and the 
prevailing interest constellation on the ground. This should facilitate to identify appropriate 
venues for enabling discretionary adaptations, as well as situations in which more constraining 
steering instruments are more promising to ensure an effective Europeanization.  
EU law ‘in action’ 
In several respects, the comprehensive case study of all local air quality and action plans in 
Germany by Gollata and Newig (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT 
PROOF>) sheds light on hitherto unknown aspects of EU law in action (Falkner et al. 2005; 
Versluis 2007). First, it empirically tests the claim advanced by polycentric governance theory 
(Hooghe and Marks 2003) that multiple levels of governance are conducive to effective 
implementation. Second, the study looks at patterns of collaboration, coordination, and 
interaction between the municipal and state levels of governance. Their findings do not 
support the abovementioned assertion. While minimally complying with the EU requirement 
to establish air quality and action plans, municipalities continued to struggle to meet air 
quality targets – with significant variation between the German Länder, and some functionally 
more affected municipalities taking their implementation task more seriously than others. 
The introduction of new functional governance layers and mandated planning (Newig and 
Koontz 2014) has not led to more effective implementation due to lacking support by the 
national government in the German case. Specifically, it proved ineffective to decentralize 
decision-making to the local level because local administrations lacked substantial 
enforcement capabilities and were unable to obligate higher levels. Furthermore, spatial 
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adaptation was scarce: planning remained largely tied to territorial jurisdictions, although 
some horizontal and vertical cooperation occurred. Finally, the process of air quality and 
action plan-making did involve non-state actors, but only on a voluntary and arbitrary basis. 
Overall, given the leeway conceded by the directives, the German Federal administration 
largely opted to keep with existing structures and procedures rather than engaging in the legal 
and institutional adaptation that would have been necessary for an actual rescaling of 
governance to the spatial level.  
Dörrenbächer (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) then 
shifts the focus to the individual motivations of caseworkers to use EU immigration law or 
domestic law, respectively, to justify their decisions. Very little research has addressed how 
individuals implement EU policy (e.g., Gulbrandsen 2011; Versluis 2007). The study is an 
excellent example of how this micro-perspective helps us understand the mechanisms of 
putting EU policy into practice. Dörrenbächer argues that EU regulatory requirements put 
street-level bureaucrats at a ‘second frontline’ that can create considerable legal ambiguities: 
first, EU law often introduces fuzzy legal concepts. Second, the EU rules may have been 
transposed incorrectly or not at all. She finds that street-level implementers are aware of the 
multi-levelled nature of the legal framework they implement. Accordingly, they creatively and 
flexibly use legal tools from different origins. This leads to variation in implementation 
practices. Yet it also creates situations in which frontline implementers may correct for 
inadequate transposition. 
While these two contributions illustrate the limits of Europeanization at the level of practical 
implementation, Scholten (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT 
PROOF>) points to an important trend toward more direct enforcement activities in ‘Brussels’. 
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Accordingly, she asks what role is necessary for the EU to play in order to promote the 
implementation of EU policies. She provides original data to illustrate the growth of three 
intertwined strategies. First, in the past 15 years the number of EU enforcement authorities, 
with parallel, hierarchical or supportive relationships with their national counterparts, has 
grown from one to seven (e.g., the European Medicines Agency EMA). Second, the number of 
EU enforcement networks bringing together relevant national authorities has increased to at 
least 20 entities. These networks include the Commission who can then influence national 
enforcement through coordination and data. Finally, enforcement standards laid down in EU 
hard, soft and case law increasingly prescribe procedural and substantive requirements for 
direct national enforcement.  
Adopting a functional spillover perspective, Scholten (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD 
/UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>, see also Scholten and Scholten 2016) explains this trend by the 
desire to ensure the implementation of EU policies in light of the limits of indirect 
enforcement. She further argues that direct enforcement by European Enforcement 
Authorities has the greatest potential to resolve the problem of non-compliance; networks 
make EU influence possible by fostering mutual learning and cooperation (also see Mavrot 
and Sager 2016); while direct enforcement through EU norms still face the well-known danger 
of incorrect or non-transposition, application and enforcement.  
These results highlight the relationship between the implementation of EU law on paper and 
its subsequent implementation in practice. The study by Gollata and Newig is a striking 
illustration that conformance with EU requirements is often not enough to ensure appropriate 
policy performance (see also Versluis 2007; Zhelyazkova et al. 2016). So is Dörrenbächer’s 
study, which points toward the potential of frontline implementation to correct for an 
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inadequate legal transposition of EU policies. Scholten’s findings reveal significant 
‘underground’ efforts of the EU to overcome the separation between the two implementation 
stages. In this sense, the conclusion to be drawn is ambiguous: clearly, multi-level governance 
poses – perhaps inherent – challenges both for a uniform and an effective implementation of 
EU policies. Simultaneously, however, many local implementers do seem to care about 
correctly implementing EU policies whenever they can. They also use opportunities to – alone 
or collaboratively – achieve optimal policy outcomes, if they are capable of effectively doing 
so. Finally, the EU seems to have more possibilities to enforce member state compliance than 
we have traditionally assumed.  
For researchers studying the practical implementation of EU law, these findings imply that we 
should tackle the theoretical and empirical relationship, or a lack thereof, between legal and 
practical implementation in the EU (Zhelyazkova et al. 2016). Second, it might be necessary to 
shift the focus to implementation levels below the member states (local as well as individual), 
if the goal is to gain a full picture of EU implementation. Conversely, Scholten (2017 <THIS 
ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>: 18) ‘invites both academics and 
policy makers at the EU and national levels to take a closer look at (…) the extent to which the 
EU’s enforcement competences (direct and indirect) have been effective in promoting the 
implementation of EU law and policies (…) to determine what type of EU’s enforcement 
competences should be desirable in specific circumstances’. Third, it seems warranted to 
address more systematically the conditions that lead implementers to refer to a correct and 
effective implementation of EU law in practice.  
The results presented here suggest several relevant contextual features that affect these 
mechanisms – information that should also be useful for practitioners. First, Gollata and Newig 
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show that it is not sufficient to confer implementation competencies to decentralized 
governance levels for effective implementation. Rather, these actors also need to be 
functionally affected and possess capacities of enforcement and obliging superordinate 
actors. Second, Dörrenbächer shows that the ambiguity and leeway engrained in both EU and 
domestic rules matter. More binding and clearer EU rules might lead implementers to weigh 
EU policy higher than domestic interests, especially when national policies are unclear or 
otherwise ‘insufficient’. Finally, the individual motivations of implementing agents play a 
decisive role for the degree to which they implement EU policy and prioritize it vis-à-vis 
domestic policies. 
Roles and motivations of implementing agents 
Europeanization research has a long tradition of assuming different logics of action that guide 
actors implementing EU law. Accordingly, most prominent theoretical frameworks assume 
that there can be rationalist or norm-based paths toward Europeanization (Börzel and Risse 
2003; Falkner et al. 2005; Jupille et al. 2003; March and Olsen 1998; Mastenbroek and Kaeding 
2006; Michelsen 2008). This distinction has primarily been applied at the level of member 
states, while neglecting the variety of actors with diverging motivations in EU implementation 
(Mastenbroek 2010) and ‘the study of individual action and its role in the transformation of 
the European political system’ (Woll and Jacquot 2010: 1; for a recent exception, see Bayram 
2017). Two contributions in this collection address this gap, both at the level of legislative 
drafters involved in processes of legal compliance (Mastenbroek 2017 <THIS ISSUE: 
PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) and frontline implementers of EU policy 
(Dörrenbächer 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>). Parallel 
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to a broader behavioral turn in Public Administration and Public Policy (Grimmelikhuijsen et 
al. 2017; John 2016), this approach is motivated by the insight that ‘individual politicians and 
civil servants involved in processes of Europeanization may vary in their propensity to comply 
with the law’ (Mastenbroek 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT 
PROOF>: 1). Fundamentally, ‘street-level implementers at the ‘frontline’, between the laws in 
the books and actual practice crucially influence the final outcome of policies’ (Dörrenbächer 
2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>: 1; Lipsky 1980/2010). 
Accordingly, both studies analyse the reasons why and situations in which implementing 
actors give different relative weigh to EU and national policies when using their discretion.  
The study by Mastenbroek (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT 
PROOF>) illuminates the ‘black box’ of adaptation of national law to EU legislation. She 
criticizes rationalist accounts for neglecting the fact that individual administrators involved in 
compliance processes may differ in their propensity to comply with EU law (Mastenbroek 2017 
<THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>: 1). She illustrates three roles 
of legislative drafters: that of ‘guardians of EU law’ striving for the best interpretation of EU 
law; the ‘translator’ as a politically loyal civil servant prioritizing national political demands; 
and the ‘integrating professional’ who seeks to reconcile EU law and domestic political 
demands, but ultimately should prioritize the former over the latter. By analysing how 
legislative drafters balance these roles with each other, she shows to what extent legislative 
actors play a role in effectively guarding EU law in the face of conflicting domestic political 
preferences.  
Based on qualitative interviews with legislative drafters in ten Dutch ministries, Mastenbroek 
(2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) finds that her 
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respondents are aware of this dual allegiance. Dutch legislative drafters reinterpret EU law 
and explore its limits in order to connect and reconcile EU law with national political demands. 
Sometimes, however, they cannot credibly do so, while staying within the bounds of EU law. 
In this case, they tend to prioritize political demands over EU legal requirements and go 
beyond the limits set by EU law. They do so even though they have received extensive training 
in the constitutive principles of EU law. Thus, legislative drafters tend to look for ‘reasonable 
arguments’ instead of working from ‘the best view’ of EU law.  
Dörrenbächer’s (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) analysis 
additionally translates the idea of a logic of consequences and a logic of appropriateness into 
instrumental and normative motivations (Sunshine and Tyler 2003). Legal ambiguity for 
frontline workers prevails when either EU law grants more discretion than national law, 
national law stands in tension EU law, or national law is even less explicit than EU rules (see 
Dörrenbächer and Mastenbroek 2017). In these situations, she expects that instrumental 
motivations will lead frontline bureaucrats to prioritize their national political principals’ 
preferences over EU law. Frontline implementers motivated by a sense of EU loyalty should 
use EU law to resolve ambiguities. Finally, substantive normative motivations (personal 
feelings of justice) should lead implementers to ‘pick and choose’ between EU and national 
law.  
Her findings indicate that the main situation in which frontline implementers explicitly refer 
to EU law is when national regulations are unclear or EU law is not transposed. Conversely, 
they do not use EU law in ways that run counter to or go beyond national law. In this sense, 
they mostly give priority to national guidance in their decisions. Instrumental motivations lead 
implementers to consider it risky to refer to EU law. Conversely, substantive (but not 
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procedural) normative motivations can trigger an active use of EU law. In essence, ‘‘double-
hatted’ street-level implementers (Egeberg and Trondal 2009) sometime use the different 
levels of law to bring about policy outcomes they personally consider as just’ (Dörrenbächer 
2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>: 22). However, when 
national norms both conflict with EU norms and do not provide clear guidance, instrumental 
motivations lead frontline implementers to consider it risky not to rely on EU law.  
From a strict conformance perspective, these findings may be rather sobering. However, they 
also provide extremely valuable lessons for EU researchers and practitioners. A first important 
insight is that individuals implementing EU policy are conscious of the content of these 
policies. They also make efforts to implement EU rules correctly. A factor consistently limiting 
these efforts is their loyalty to domestic policies and political principals, which they often 
prioritize over their EU loyalty. This suggests an important link between legal and practical 
implementation. A factor that can trigger their reference to EU rules, in turn, is their desire to 
bring about ‘better’ policy outcomes (Elmore 1979; Lipsky 1980/2010) – following normative, 
but sometimes also rationalist motivations. While the interplay between different logics of 
action has been subject to much dispute, these motivations do appear useful for studying 
Europeanization at the individual level. This then also implies that the behavioural 
components of EU policy implementation deserve further exploration, including possibilities 
to ‘nudge’ individual policy implementers (John 2016). Importantly, these findings 
considerably advance our understanding of patterns of and the interplay between 
Europeanization and domestication processes. 
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The interplay between Europeanization and domestication 
Bugdahn (2005: 177-178) argues that ‘the implementation of EU policies is best 
conceptualized as a blend of domestic choices of options in a policy area, only some of which 
have been determined by the EU’. In this vein, Europeanization – the EU influence over 
domestic policy choices in a given policy – is only one side of the coin. Simultaneously, 
‘member states can make choices of non-prescribed or non-recommended policy options that 
limit, mediate or accompany the Europeanization of the policy area in various forms’ (Bugdahn 
2005: 178). This complementary force of domestication poses a challenge for EU 
implementation research: ‘instead of simply equating the implementation of EU policies with 
Europeanization scholars should develop and make use of concepts that (a) allow for the 
determination of the relative weight and importance of the EU in the national context and (b) 
capture the dual nature of the implementation process’ (Bugdahn 2005: 179). The 
contributions of this collection allow for preliminary conclusions about the complex interplay 
of Europeanization and domestication dynamics, and factors affecting it at different stages of 
the implementation cycle.  
Choice of implementation type. According to Heidbreder (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO 
ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>), the levels of conflict and ambiguity of the policy under 
question determine which implementation strategies promise to be effective (Matland 1995). 
Some strategies are less constraining for domestication, some more. When the different 
political actors have strong shared interests, then strategies emphasizing Europeanization 
over domestication come into play. If the policy is relatively unambiguous, implementation 
can be centralized in a top-down manner. If ambiguity is high, delegation to an agency is a 
likely option. Conversely, when there are conflicting interests, implementation strategies 
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should allow for a high degree of domestication. If ambiguity is low, bottom-up 
implementation strategies can lead to ‘voluntary’ convergence. If ambiguity is high, policy-
specific networks are a flexible strategy. 
Legal transposition. The results presented by Thomann and Zhelyazkova (2017 <THIS ISSUE: 
PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) illustrate that Europeanization dynamics 
strongly influence the domestication of EU policy. A large amount of domestication follows a 
direction that conforms to EU policy. Within this framework outlined by EU policy, the authors 
find evidence of a high diversity of domestication strategies, which they argue point to the 
importance of domestic politics. Mastenbroek (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD 
/UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) confirms these insights by showing that legislative drafters 
interpret EU policy in order to reconcile Europeanization with domestication. Yet if a 
reconciliation of EU requirements with the preferences of national political principals is not 
possible, then domestication trumps Europeanization. 
Practical application. The findings provided by Gollata and Newig (2017 <THIS ISSUE: 
PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) suggest that an implementation strategy 
aimed at capitalizing on domestication does not perform well in a context where decentralized 
implementing actors have discretion, but no power and capacity. In such a situation, 
Europeanization may be limited to conformance, and domestication (here: non-adaptation) 
may not be conducive to performance. Dörrenbächer (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD 
/UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) suggests that domestication beats Europeanization, if the 
relationship between EU and national policy is ambiguous and frontline implementers have 
discretion. 
Enforcement. Scholten (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) 
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shows how the EU is in an ongoing process of countering the practical non-conformance with 
EU policy by Europeanizing the enforcement of EU policy – a domain which, with the exception 
of competition law, has traditionally been a central source of domestication (see also Jensen 
2007; Kelemen 2012). Simultaneously, the institutional choices made allow member states to 
retain a certain amount of control over enforcement. 
Scholten (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) further 
discusses how the balance between Europeanization and domestication challenges the 
legitimacy of the EU governance structure. Essentially, she argues that the domestication of 
EU enforcement serves the system’s input legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). The Treaties do not 
foresee the shift of enforcement power to the EU. She also argues that accountabilities did 
not accommodate this power shift, since EU and national systems of judicial control over EU 
law enforcement remain strictly separated. This could result in blame avoidance (cf. 
Hinterleitner 2017; Hinterleitner and Sager 2016) and situations where member states cannot 
hold EU enforcement authorities accountable. In an EU with diverse legal cultures, shared 
enforcement also requires institutional, procedural and substantive adaptations that can pose 
their own legitimacy problems. Scholten concludes that the Europeanization of enforcement 
would have to be more effective in order to compensate for this lack of input legitimacy with 
increased output legitimacy. However, there is no empirical proof of this yet.  
In a similar vein, Thomann and Zhelyazkova 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE 
DETAILS AT PROOF>: 20) highlight how bottom-up implementation theory assumes that 
discretion for implementers ‘can facilitate context-sensitive solutions of the original policy 
problem at stake and increase the likelihood of effective and broadly accepted policy solutions 
at the point where the problem is most immediate. (…) European integration is increasingly 
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perceived as a loss of sovereignty over national policies. The customization phenomenon (…) 
illuminates how member states use transposition as an opportunity to modify EU law and 
regain control’ (see also Zhelyazkova 2013).  
These comments suggest that the ‘optimal’ balance between Europeanization and 
domestication fundamentally depends on the capacity of the configuration of these two 
forces to resolve joint policy problems effectively in the EU. In this respect, a performance-
oriented perspective on EU implementation can make a viable contribution. 
Directions for a performance perspective on EU implementation  
Considerations of legitimacy and acceptance are not merely of academic interest. Rothstein 
(2014) argues that political science tends not to put enough focus on the state machinery and 
its performance or lack thereof. As Héritier (2016: 17) points out, ‘this argument is particularly 
interesting in the light of empirical findings which indicate that in public opinion good 
governance of the state is a more important source of democratic legitimation than the 
correct and fair democratic procedures as such’. Prominent politicians like Martin Schulz have 
argued that the acceptance of EU decisions can be enhanced by bringing them closer to the 
citizens – by deciding globally, but decentralizing as much implementation power as possible 
to local actors who know how to best resolve the problem.1 A crucial advantage of a 
performance perspective on EU implementation is that it complements a conformance 
                                                     
 
 
1 Martin Schulz, 2.7.2016, programme conference „Europe“ of the German Social Democratic Party, Berlin. 
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approach to emphasize domestication dynamics in the analysis of Europeanization. Thereby, 
it allows for putting assertions as the ones above to empirical scrutiny.  
A performance-oriented perspective on EU implementation can add significantly to our 
theoretical understanding of multi-level and particularly EU implementation, and move the 
latter forward in the direction of implementation as problem-solving (Elmore 1979). By 
shedding light on the complex interplay between Europeanization and domestication, such a 
perspective can reveal conditions under which this interplay can foster effective policy 
solutions (see also Knill and Tosun 2012; Richardson 2012; Richardson and Mazey 2015). Doing 
so is important to better understand the link between legal and practical implementation, and 
the situations in which conformance is or is not enough to achieve good policy performance 
(Keman 2000). This in turn should stimulate the further exploitation of synergies between 
differing analytic lenses. For example, analysing the process of interpretation of EU law by 
individual implementers helps understand the conditions under which compliance with EU 
law is improbable. Analytically, it helps us to conceptualize and operationalize the complex 
mechanisms and outcomes of multi-level implementation systems. Researchers may identify 
which properties of EU and domestic policies and institutions trigger different implementation 
dynamics, and accordingly, appropriate implementation strategies; or which enforcement 
strategies are warranted in specific circumstances.  
Methodological considerations 
An analytic focus on complexity, processes, individual interpretations and motivations, and 
policy outcomes also bears methodological challenges that have more broadly been 
associated with bottom-up implementation studies (e.g., Hupe and Hill 2016). The high 
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internal validity aspired by such research questions often implies an in-depth focus and 
considerable efforts of primary data collection and analysis, resulting in research designs that 
do not allow for representative and generalizable insights (Hartlapp and Falkner 2009; see 
scope conditions in Table 1). Such studies then sometimes have a descriptive character and 
often do not allow for disentangling parsimonious explanations from purely context-
dependent (e.g., policy-specific) patterns (Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Treib 2014). However, 
Héritier (2016: 11) also rightly points out that the ‘rigour versus relevance question is not a 
question of quantitative or qualitative research but rather a question of (…) opting for 
substantive problem oriented, methodologically stringent research in a limited-scope 
theoretical context’. 
In this vein, several methodological strategies appear promising to obtain, in a cumulative 
manner, a more complete picture of policy implementation and effectiveness in the EU (see 
Toshkov 2016). First, qualitative implementation studies should explicitly formulate scope 
conditions for their findings, that is, the analytically relevant properties of their case(s) that 
influence what answers they find to their research question (Mahoney and Goertz 2004). 
Second, comparative Europeanization research needs systematic, theoretically grounded 
conceptualizations of core concepts that capture diversity and performance in EU 
implementation beyond compliance, which allow for their application in diverse research 
contexts while preserving the equivalence of concept meaning and measurement (Adcock and 
Collier 2001; for examples see Bondarouk and Liefferink 2016; Bondarouk and Mastenbroek 
2017; Thomann and Zhelyazkova 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT 
PROOF>, online appendix; Tummers et al. 2012). This way, the results of different studies can 
more directly speak to each other. Third, the best research arguably combines ‘the best of 
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both worlds’, for example, through mixed-methods research involving collaborations with 
colleagues with different methodological skills (Héritier 2016). Nested designs identify 
patterns across large sets of cases and then select analytically relevant cases for in-depth 
analyses of underlying mechanisms (Lieberman 2005; Schneider and Rohlfing 2013).  
Finally, while ready-made databases on EU implementation are biased toward certain aspects 
of legal compliance (Hartlapp and Falkner 2009), alternative options for data collection and 
analysis in less ‘optimal’ data contexts do exist. For example, survey pools in bureaucracies or 
experimental designs are useful to analyse the motivations of policy implementers 
(Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2017; Tummers et al. 2012). Innovative techniques of quantitative 
text analysis can systematically extract information from large amounts of EU conformity and 
evaluation reports (Grimmer et al. 2013; Klüver 2009). Finally, set-theoretic methods such as 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2012) or 
explanatory typologies (Møller and Skaaning 2015) model several of the causal patterns 
identified in this collection. For example, they assume that ‘many ways can lead to Rome’, that 
configurations of factors matter, and that the same factor may not always have the same 
effect, depending on the context (Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2012; Thomann and Maggetti 
2017; e.g., Cacciatore et al. 2015; Di Lucia et al. 2010; Maatsch 2014; Schmälter 2017; Sager 
and Thomann 2016; Thomann 2015).  
Ways ahead 
Given their limited generalizability, the findings of this collection call for more comparative 
research, channeling efforts and resources to go beyond the ‘usual suspects’ of countries and 
policies traditionally studied in EU implementation research. To conclude, we outline three 
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core features of a promising research agenda for testing the applicability of our conclusions 
about the interplay between Europeanization and domestication in other contexts. 
First, more research is needed that addresses the practical effectiveness of EU policy, while 
accounting for context-specific patterns from a performance perspective (e.g., Skjærseth and 
Wettestadt 2008; Toshkov and de Haan 2013). In particular, the results of this collection 
encourage us to explore the relevant properties of policies and institutions creating different 
implementation dynamics, as well as the conditions under which implementers implement EU 
law correctly and effectively. As outlined above, such a comparative ambition has both 
conceptual and methodological implications. The question of actual performance also 
requires a more evaluative perspective, raising challenges regarding data availability and the 
quality of legislative ex-post evaluation in the EU (Mastenbroek et al. 2016).  
In this vein, the contributions of this collection highlight many open research questions about 
the EU’s practical problem-solving capacity. For instance, Heidbreder (2017 <THIS ISSUE: 
PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) calls for more research on the conditions 
under which particular implementation strategies prove effective, and the role of the factual 
and normative ambiguity of policies therein (Matland 1995; Schmidt 2008). Thomann and 
Zhelyazkova (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) suggest to 
strive for a more in-depth and improved coding of customization especially in the face of legal 
ambiguity. They propose to analyse its empirical relevance so as to systematically compare 
discretionary freedoms across different member states and issue areas. This paves the way 
for identifying the conditions under which national authorities increase or decrease the 
leeway of domestic implementing actors; how member states make use of different 
dimensions of customization to satisfy domestic interests during implementation; and to what 
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extent more or less restrictive interpretations of EU rules enhance the legitimacy and 
acceptance of EU law ‘on the ground’ (see Dörrenbächer and Mastenbroek 2017). Gollata and 
Newig (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) call for a more 
thorough analysis of rationales and institutional prerequisites that drive the choice of 
governance approaches, such as diverging ‘governance cultures’. We must disentangle the 
effect of the governance model from that of contextual factors in order to assess the 
usefulness of policy implementation through multi-level governance. 
Second, we need to gain a better understanding of the processes, mechanisms and 
motivations underlying patterns of compliance and diversity. To this end, it is crucial that 
Europeanization research focuses more explicitly on individuals implementing EU law, 
connecting the micro level with meso level and macro level variables. In this regard, EU 
implementation research can benefit from integrating recent theoretical and methodological 
developments in Behavioral Public Administration and Policy research (e.g., Grimmelikhuijsen 
et al. 2017; John 2016; Tummers et al. 2012) and drawing from the literature on social 
psychology and socialization processes (e.g., Bayram 2017; Beyers 2010; Sunshine and Tyler 
2003; Tyler 1990). Such an approach facilitates a deeper understanding of the organizational 
and national structures, cultures and institutions involved in EU implementation. For example, 
it can lend empirical substance to recurring arguments such as Falkner et al.’s (2005) ‘worlds 
of compliance’, or Gibson and Caldeira’s (1996) legal cultures of Europe. 
Our collection points to several research gaps in this respect. Mastenbroek (2017 <THIS ISSUE: 
PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>), for example, proposes to carry out 
comparative large-N explanatory research on the roles chosen by EU-involved drafters or 
other civil servants (Bayram 2017; Egeberg 1999; Sager and Overeem 2015), taking into 
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account background variables such as age and seniority, but also more theoretically informed 
variables such as instrumental and normative considerations. Dörrenbächer (2017 <THIS 
ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) poses two crucial questions for 
future research: what role does EU law play for implementers who operate under less 
discretion (Trondal 2011; Wockelberg 2014) – and what is the relationship between normative 
and instrumental motivations and the use of EU law?  
Third, a thorough understanding of the effects and acceptance of EU policies requires 
researchers to tackle the challenging task of linking different stages of the policy cycle in the 
EU multi-level system. For example, the present collection advances our knowledge of the 
relationship between the EU implementation on paper and in practice (Versluis 2007; 
Zhelyzkova et al. 2016). Beyond the implementation stage, more research should scrutinize 
how EU policy making interacts with implementation (e.g., Thomson 2010; Zhelyazkova 2013). 
Next to the question of how member states regain control over EU policies during 
implementation (Thomann and Zhelyazkova 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE 
DETAILS AT PROOF>), we also know very little about how implementation decisions are 
reloaded into decision-making in order to optimize EU policies. In this regard, the interplay 
between implementation and legislative design deserves more attention. How do EU 
institutions try to ‘stack the deck’ of EU implementation by installing and stimulating checks 
and balances on non-compliance (Kelemen 2012)? 
In this latter vein, Scholten (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT 
PROOF>) stresses the importance of investigating the extent to which different EU 
enforcement strategies have been effective in addressing certain non-implementation 
problems of EU law and policies, and subject to which conditions. As she notes, ‘such studies 
 23 
 
could contribute to building a model, which would also be useful for policy-makers, to 
determine what type of EU’s enforcement competences should be desirable in specific 
circumstances (…) The findings on effectiveness could also inform researchers investigating 
the legitimacy of the EU and the ‘underground’ method of expanding power. (…) future studies 
also need to consider whether, in light of these challenges [in terms of legitimacy, 
accountability and the organization of shared enforcement], this ‘solution’ is indeed worthy’ 
(Scholten 2017: 19).  
This collection illustrates that research tackling such questions benefits from complementing 
a compliance perspective with a performance perspective. This implies a procedural view on 
EU implementation as an act of interpretation of EU policy by actors who operate within 
multiple (policy and domestic) contexts, characterized by a complex interplay between 
Europeanization and domestication dynamics (Bugdahn 2005). We argue that such research 
should strive for more cumulativeness and integrate insights from neighbouring literatures. 
More comparative approaches require systematic conceptualizations and innovative data 
collection strategies and methodologies. Jointly, such research efforts will increase our 
understanding of the inherent trade-offs between conformance, the diversity of member-
state legislation, and efficient and effective problem-solving (Scharpf 1997) in the EU 
multilevel system. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Summary of results 
Contri-
bution  
Thomann & 
Zhelyazkova Mastenbroek Gollata & Newig Dörrenbächer Scholten Heidbreder 
Stage Transposition Legal compliance Practical application Practical application Enforcement Choice of 
implementation type 
Unit of 
analysis 
EU rules transposed in 
Member states 
Individuals in 
ministries 
Programs 
implemented at local 
level 
Decision-making by 
frontline 
implementers 
EU direct 
enforcement 
strategies 
Policies 
Actors Member states Legislative drafters Municipalities Case workers  EU agencies & 
networks 
Policy makers 
Research 
interest 
Customization: 
discretionary changes 
of EU policies during 
transposition 
 Conceptualization 
& measurement 
 Patterns across 
MS & policies 
 Relationship 
between 
customized 
density & 
restrictiveness 
 
Frontline of EU 
compliance 
 Typology of dual 
roles: EU 
guardian vs. 
politically loyal 
civil servant 
 Propensity of 
double-hatted 
actors to be 
guardians of EU 
law in the face of 
conflicting 
domestic political 
preferences 
Conduciveness of 
Multi-Level 
Governance to 
effective policy 
implementation 
 Decentralization, 
spatial fit & 
participation 
 Collaboration & 
coordination 
among 
municipalities 
 Interaction 
between 
municipal & state 
levels 
 
Motivations of street-
level implementers  
 ‘second frontline’ 
between 
domestic & EU 
regulation creates 
new legal 
ambiguities 
 Instrumental 
motivations 
should 
discourage, 
normative 
motivations 
should generate 
uses of EU law 
 
Role of EU in directly 
enforcing EU policy 
 Three 
enforcement 
strategies  
 Conditions for 
effectiveness of 
these strategies 
 Challenges posed 
by direct EU 
enforcement 
Derive 
implementation 
strategies beyond 
conceptually limited 
compliance 
perspective 
 Combine top-
down/bottom-up 
and vertical / 
horizontal MLG 
dimensions 
 Functional 
expectations 
about strategic 
choices 
 
Policy 21 Environment Cross-sectoral EU air quality policy Migration policy  EU-wide -- 
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Contri-
bution  
Thomann & 
Zhelyazkova Mastenbroek Gollata & Newig Dörrenbächer Scholten Heidbreder 
area(s) / 
case(s) 
Directives (N = 894) 
10 Justice & Home 
Affairs Directives (N = 
750) 
27 MS 
10 Dutch ministries 137 air quality and 
action plans in 16 
German Länder 
21 case workers of 10 
Ausländerbehörden in 
North Rhine-
Westphalia, Germany 
EU enforcement 
authorities, networks 
and soft, hard and 
case law 
Methods Manual coding of 
conformity reports 
Descriptive statistics 
31 qualitative 
interviews 
Quantitative & 
qualitative content 
analysis of documents 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Qualitative interviews Analysis of legal 
sources, official 
documents & multi-
disciplinary literature 
Literature review/ 
theory paper 
Core 
findings 
Considerable diversity 
of transposition 
beyond compliance 
Relationship between 
customized density & 
restrictiveness varies 
between policy areas 
Pronounced policy-
specific logics 
Legislative drafters 
recognize dual roles 
They employ 
interpretative 
techniques to bridge 
EU law with political 
preferences 
Political steering 
trumps EU 
requirements 
Decentralization 
ineffective due to 
lacking substantial 
enforcement 
capabilities of local 
administrations 
Planning remained 
tied to territorial 
jurisdictions 
Participatory planning 
voluntary & arbitrary 
 
Different levels of law 
used to produce’ just’ 
outcomes 
Instrumental 
motivations trigger 
limited use of EU law 
Substantive normative 
motivations trigger 
active use of EU law 
(procedural 
motivations are 
limited) 
 
Proliferation of EU 
enforcement 
authorities and their 
direct enforcement 
powers 
Growing number of 
enforcement 
networks 
More hard, soft and 
case law regulating 
domestic 
enforcement 
 
Four ideal-types of 
implementation: 
centralization, 
agencification, 
convergence, 
networking 
Only under certain 
conditions a particular 
strategy will lead to 
effective 
implementation  
Europea-
nization 
dynamics 
EU policy matters: 
Customization often 
follows direction of 
flexibility allowed for 
by EU provisions 
Attempts to integrate 
EU legal requirements 
with national policy 
objectives whenever 
possible (escalation 
ladder) 
Minimal compliance 
given (but air quality 
targets not met) 
Learning & capacity 
building 
Implementers 
complement national 
law with EU law when 
the former is unclear 
Some implementers 
correct for missing 
transposition 
Trend of enforcement 
moving to Brussels 
Direct enforcement by 
EU entity has greatest 
problem-solving 
potential 
Partly lacking juridical 
accountability/ 
legitimacy of EEAs 
More constraining 
implementation types 
effective when little 
conflict/ ambiguity 
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Contri-
bution  
Thomann & 
Zhelyazkova Mastenbroek Gollata & Newig Dörrenbächer Scholten Heidbreder 
Domest-
ication 
dynamics 
Domestic politics: 
Significant country 
differences in 
compliant 
customization 
Role conflicts often 
lead to prioritization 
of national political 
preferences 
Leeway led German 
administration to 
keep with existing 
structures & 
procedures 
Most implementers 
prioritize national 
guidance in their 
decision making 
Member states retain 
some control over 
enforcement thanks 
to institutional 
choices (agencies, 
networks) 
 
Less constraining 
types effective when 
high conflict/ 
ambiguity 
Scope 
conditions 
Policies represent 
regulatory logics of 
both positive and 
negative integration 
Comprehensive 
sample of old and new 
MS 
 
Limitations: 
Incomplete 
information 
Expert evaluations 
under-represent full 
extent of compliant 
customization, 
especially for 
ambiguous rules 
Most different 
systems identifies 
varieties of strategies 
Likely case for a sense 
of EU loyalty 
Strong rule of law 
 
 
Limitations: 
Analytically 
representative but not 
statistically 
generalizable 
Under-researched 
policy 
Policy lacks spatial fit  
Full sample of 
implementation in 
Germany 
 
 
Limitations: 
Contextually 
contingent 
Normatively laden & 
client-intensive policy 
is crucial case for 
motivations 
High discretion & legal 
ambiguity 
 
 
Limitations: 
No statistical 
generalization 
May not apply to 
technical policy fields 
Full sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Limitations: 
Causes and empirical 
consequences of 
trend mostly 
unknown 
Strongly embedded in 
Europeanization & 
policy implementation 
literature 
 
 
 
 
Limitations: 
Empirical testing 
needed 
 
